Description: The BIOS integrity is paramount to the safety of the platform. Research as BIOS Chronomancy show that an attacker that exists in its own BIOS can evade detection by the Trusted Platform Module, and can even survive attempts to reflash the BIOS. In addition, the laboratory of things unseen shown in Intel Trusted Execution Technology Attacking a present in the SMM malware can interfere with the execution TXT. Because it is the BIOS SMM who initially configured, it appears that the BIOS control means having the SMM control. However, as we shall see, the reverse can also be true, and control may involve SMM BIOS control. The central role of the BIOS on the platform of security and the need to patch the BIOS updates legitimate sellers, poses an interesting problem. The most common solution that sellers usually adopt mechanisms is the use of flash-chip protection Intel architecture to provide a routine for updating the BIOS verifies the signature of the incoming update, before running for the BIOS. Described in this scheme, there are two areas susceptible to attack to try to break the signature requirement BIOS: protection mechanisms of the Intel architecture, and forced the signing and implementation of routine update of the seller. In this talk we demonstrate two kinds of attacks, one against each of these objectives. In both cases, these allow an attacker attacks arbitrarily reflash the BIOS in a number of systems, despite the presence of the BIOS signed enforcement.
About Corey Kallenberg
Corey is Kallenberg Security researcher with interests in security and operating systems firmwares. He has presented the results of their research in Security SO / firmware in DEFCON, NoSuchCon, Blackhat USA and IEEE S & P. Today, Corey is using its expertise in developing operational and trusted computing to investigate safety issues BIOS / UEFI systems.
About John Butterworth, Sam Cornwell, Xeno Kovah
John Butterworth is a researcher at Security at The MITRE Corporation, which specializes in low-level security. Butterworth apply their knowledge in electrical and firmware naval engineering to investigate security UEFI / BIOS. Xeno Leader in Infosec Engineer at The MITRE Corporation, a not-for-profit organization that manages six federal research and development centers (FFRDCs). Xeno is the project leader of the analysis team to detect BIOS subversions of advanced system. He previously worked in the Checkmate project. The emphasis of both projects is on how to make the mensurador agent can not be lied to by the attacker. Sam Cornwell works as a researcher at MITRE.
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